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O
n 8 October 2000, the acting 
district director of health 
services for the Gulu district 
in northwestern Uganda received 
two concurrent reports of an unusual 
illness with high mortality, occurring 
in the community and at a local 
hospital. One report attributed the 
illness to poisoning at a funeral at a 
remote village in the far north of the 
district. At the same time, the medical 
superintendent of the hospital also 
reported to the health authorities that 
he was experiencing a cluster of cases 
of critically ill patients, and that there 
had been several deaths, including 
some nurses. 
These events heralded what was 
to become the largest outbreak of 
Ebola fever so far described, involving 
425 cases, of whom 224 died. The 
development of the epidemic and 
the measures taken to try and control 
it have recently been reported by 
Lamunu and her colleagues [1]. Their 
report underlines the challenges 
faced when dealing with such highly 
contagious and highly virulent 
infections. (At the request of PLoS 
Medicine, Lamunu et al. have made a 
full-text version of their report available 
on the World Health Organization Web 
site [2].)
Ebola Virus
Ebola virus is a member of the family 
Filoviridae, which consists of two 
distinctive species, Marburg and Ebola, 
both of which cause severe and often 
fatal haemorrhagic disease in humans 
and monkeys. The viruses have a 
distinctive ﬁ  lamentous morphology 
under the electron microscope 
and a genome that consists of a 
nonsegmented, negative-stranded RNA 
approximately 19 kb in length. 
Three distinct subtypes (genotypes) 
of Ebola have been described that are 
pathogenic for humans: Ebola-Zaire, 
Ebola-Sudan, and Ebola–Côte d’Ivoire. 
A fourth type, Ebola-Reston, affects 
only primates but has been identiﬁ  ed 
in animal facilities in the United States, 
Italy, and the Philippines.
The Illness
Ebola is transmitted person to person 
by direct contact with infected body 
ﬂ  uids, or by direct inoculation via 
contaminated instruments such as 
needles or razors. The incubation 
period of Ebola haemorrhagic fever 
is usually between four and 21 days. 
The illness is characterised by an acute 
onset of fever, malaise, myalgia, severe 
frontal headache, and pharyngitis. 
One of the great difﬁ  culties in making 
the diagnosis is that these symptoms 
are typical of many acute infective 
syndromes that occur in Ebola-endemic 
areas. 
As the disease progresses patients 
develop a maculopapular rash, 
typically at about six days, followed by 
vomiting and bloody diarrhoea, with 
uncontrollable haemorrhage from 
needle sites and body oriﬁ  ces. Death 
is from shock secondary to blood 
loss. Treatment is largely supportive, 
although a recent study has reported 
promising results with an inhibitor of 
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tissue factor, which may help control 
the bleeding diathesis [3]. 
The Ugandan Outbreak
Lamunu et al. describe how initial 
identiﬁ  cation of the outbreak was 
delayed: six weeks elapsed before 
the Ugandan Ministry of Health was 
notiﬁ  ed. There were several reasons for 
this delay. In part it could be explained 
by a weak surveillance system, especially 
at the local and regional levels. But 
also, the nonspeciﬁ  c nature of the 
symptoms meant that the initial, 
sporadic cases were frequently 
attributed to malaria or typhoid, and 
patients turned to local healers for 
help. Important, too, was the fact 
that this was the ﬁ  rst outbreak of viral 
haemorrhagic fever in Uganda, and 
lack of familiarity with the disease 
caused further delays. 
It was only when clusters of cases 
became apparent that wider public 
health measures were instituted, and 
the outbreak started to come under 
control. In this phase, too, there were 
important lessons to learn. The initial 
identiﬁ  cation of the disease as due to 
Ebola virus was made in the World 
Health Organization laboratories in 
South Africa, but soon thereafter a ﬁ  eld 
laboratory was established, and this 
proved invaluable in guiding both case 
management and surveillance activities. 
Early involvement of specialised 
agencies, including the Global 
Outbreak and Response Network of 
the World Health Organization, was 
essential. Disseminating up-to-date 
information through the media, and 
the local communities, was important 
in getting the population “on side”. 
Lessons from the Outbreak
The 2000 outbreak in Uganda was the 
last large outbreak, but other, smaller 
outbreaks continue to occur. During 
2004 alone there have been two further 
epidemics: in January there were 35 
cases in the Congo, with 29 deaths, 
and in August a smaller outbreak in 
the Sudan infected 17 patients, of 
whom seven died [4,5]. In each of 
these cases the epidemic was brought 
under control relatively quickly, and 
the infection was largely localised to 
the immediately surrounding area. 
However, the lessons of the Uganda 
outbreak have obvious resonance with 
many of the recent concerns that have 
been raised about the global spread of 
infectious diseases, be they naturally 
acquired or related to potential 
biowarfare. 
By and large, once an outbreak 
has been recognised by the public 
health authorities there are well-tried 
processes and procedures that come 
into play that serve to contain further 
spread of the infection and limit 
additional cases of the disease. This was 
shown spectacularly in the case of the 
SARS outbreak, in which not only was 
the disease controlled but the novel 
causative agent was identiﬁ  ed, both 
within a few months. But as Lamunu 
and colleagues make clear, the most 
difﬁ  cult aspect of the outbreak control 
is the initial recognition of the disease: 
diagnosis depends on the astute health-
care worker who notices an unusual 
clinical picture, or more usually, an 
unexpected cluster of cases. Although 
the viral haemorrhagic fevers have 
until now been largely conﬁ  ned to 
their epidemic foci in Africa, cases will 
continue to occur from time to time in 
travellers, in whom diagnosis may be 
delayed. 
The key lessons from the Gulu 
outbreak are the extremely high case 
mortality of Ebola and the importance 
of instituting rigorous procedures to 
control cross-infection. These lessons 
are crucial both for communities 
in Africa, where public health 
infrastructures are often suboptimal, 
and in developed countries, where the 
infrastructure is sophisticated but can 
only be deployed once the disease is 
recognised.  
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